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I.-82 
THE FEMALE LEGAL REALIST INSIDE  
THE COMMON LAW 
ANN BARTOW* 
Abstract: This essay, a response piece to Anita Bernstein’s thought-provoking 
book The Common Law Inside the Female Body, examines the powerful tool of 
the common law and the role that judges play in wielding it. I begin by drawing 
on my twenty-four years of teaching and looking at the questions that I, and my 
students, grapple with every year while studying the common law: Do the unco-
ordinated actions of individual judges, juries, and lawyers and parties generate an 
efficient legal system? And does that system result in some version of justice for 
most of the parties, most of the time, including women? Bernstein’s book an-
swers these questions in the affirmative and I agree. Utilizing the lens of legal re-
alism, this essay argues that judges, wielding the common law, ultimately strive 
to, and in fact their fundamental role is to promote fairness. I examine why the 
“human” element of judges is so important to the promotion of fairness and elim-
ination of bias, as evidenced by recent failures by Google and Amazon to elimi-
nate bias from their algorithms. Although both Bernstein and I acknowledge that 
judges have sometimes failed to promote the common law’s true purpose, one 
can find, even in those “failings” the creation of negative liberties for women. 
Used creatively and appropriately, the common law is a critical tool for promot-
ing justice.  
INTRODUCTION 
Anita Bernstein’s brilliant new book The Common Law Inside the Female 
Body is a truly unique contribution to both feminist jurisprudence and the law 
of torts. It is written in Bernstein’s distinctive, engaging voice, and it pulls a 
wide range of topics together into an illuminating extended work of legal 
scholarship. It is a book that smart law students should consider tackling after 
completing at least an introductory torts course to help them process the resid-
ual uncomfortable feelings they often have about how inconsistently the com-
mon law treats people who have been injured. 
Reading Bernstein’s wry, often gripping, and occasionally amusing ob-
servations about the slow slog towards gender justice of the common law made 
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me reflect fairly extensively upon my teaching. Here are some foundational 
generalizations I have constructed during twenty-four years of teaching law, 
particularly as applied to torts: Motivated first-semester law students usually 
start off wanting the law they learn to make sense. They want two cases with 
essentially the same facts to be decided the same way. They want coherent, 
stable, easily ascertainable rules. They want all the state courts to follow the 
most recent Restatement, which they would like to contain a guide to the cor-
rect answers. All of these are completely appropriate desires. Learning that 
almost every tort-based legal dispute will usually have at least two distinct 
outcomes that can be defined and justified with existing case law is deeply un-
settling to most students. They begin to recognize that whether a client obtains 
a “positive outcome” largely depends on the level of preparation and persua-
siveness of their lawyers. That realization can be frightening. 
I find that I can usually guess the course of study any given student pur-
sued as an undergraduate based on how they react to the first couple of weeks 
of torts classes. Liberal arts majors want to discuss how they feel about the 
cases they read. STEM majors desire data, formulas, and clear answers. Business 
majors focus on how the common law affects commerce. Political science ma-
jors want to expand discussions beyond the courts, incorporating acts, and omis-
sions by the other two branches of government. The ones who have studied Lat-
in like to show it off.1 And almost everybody hopes that if they do enough rote 
memorization, they will be able to disguise how confused they are. 
Though a good memory is always useful, it will not help anyone fully de-
cipher the common law and how it functions. That requires a lot of reading and 
thoughtful analysis, and if Bernstein’s book teaches us nothing else it is that 
the common law is an ongoing project of significant proportions. 
I. IT DEPENDS 
I enjoy telling new law students that no matter what query is thrown at 
them in a common law course, answering “it depends” is usually correct. The 
challenge I pose for them is to explain competently on what exactly the answer 
depends. This is a nicer way of ascertaining if they can read a case and find its 
holding using both hands and a map. Students do not like it when I respond to 
their questions with questions of my own, so I usually reserve doing that for 
situations in which the assigned reading has provided a clear answer, and even 
then I aim for a tone of helpful guidance rather than shaming. But part of be-
coming a lawyer is learning to answer your own questions because once one 
enters the practice of law, answering the questions posed by clients, judges, 
and/or employers is a huge part of the job. 
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When I started out as a law professor I wanted to be an effective class-
room teacher, and that is still my greatest professional desire. What has 
changed, though, is my conception of what effective classroom teaching is. In 
a way, I guess my teaching practices have evolved in a common law sort of 
manner. My goals remain static, but I slightly shift the means I use to reach 
them every time I teach a subject. I am eternally in search of the elusive per-
fect balance between motivational toughness and clarity of comprehension, 
which perhaps can be characterized as classroom justice. 
Torts is a challenging subject that requires students to learn how the 
common law works and to do so quickly. Bernstein’s book is ultimately a re-
ward for those who have conquered the basics and are ready to have their new-
ly formed assumptions both supported and challenged. Part of writing a book 
about the common law is identifying and articulating a thesis and then defend-
ing it. A couple of the fundamental questions that Bernstein addresses in her 
fabulous book: Do the uncoordinated actions of individual judges, juries, law-
yers, and parties generate an efficient legal system? And does that system re-
sult in some version of justice for most of the parties, most of the time, includ-
ing women? Bernstein’s answer is yes to both queries, and I think she is cor-
rect. By convincing me to be more optimistic about the judiciary, she has given 
me fresh insights about the history and functioning of the common law that 
will infuse and improve my teaching in the future. My favorite part of the book 
is its final paragraph, which I reproduce in part here: 
The possessor of a female body who resists invasions and incursions 
of her daily life through the common law builds her freedom. She 
starts with the negative kind of liberty and then gains affirmative 
goods and pleasures when she may say no as she pleases. The 
wealth of nations—by which I mean wealth in the most capacious 
sense of the word—gets bigger when every person can maintain the 
boundary around herself.2 
Identifying the positive powers of the common law is a new way to frame 
the way I teach torts. Though I will not assign this book to my first-year stu-
dents, I will describe more than a few of her observations and conclusions. 
Because she cites and quotes William Blackstone so frequently I am tempted 
to intentionally misstate the author’s name when I lecture as “Anita Bernstone” 
and refer to her book as “Bernstone on Torts,” but only when I am certain my 
students have studied enough English law to get the joke. 
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II. PRACTICAL LEGAL REALISM, HANDWAVING, AND THE EQUITY SHUFFLE 
I consider myself a legal realist. I think that judges consider not only ab-
stract rules, but also social interests, public policy, the personal characteristics 
of the parties, and a personal theory of justice when deciding a case. Some of 
this is done consciously, but many outcome determinations are driven by an 
unexamined but intense internal, personal sense of fairness. Bernstein suggests 
that is a reason for optimism: Judges can be persuaded to be fair to women. 
Sometimes the common law will guide them to fairness with little friction. 
Other times, though, they have to engage in what Bernstein charmingly refers 
to as “handwaving.” The judges know the outcome they think fairness re-
quires, but struggle to explain it as the natural consequence of extant common 
law in the area. As a result, they resort to deflection: “Look over here at my 
holding, isn’t it great? Don’t worry so much about how I reached it!” During 
my first semester of law school, this phenomenon was trenchantly explained 
somewhat differently (though equally vividly) by my contracts professor, who, 
rather than invoking handwaving, would suggest that a deflecting judge or 
panel was “doing the equity shuffle” and then perform an awkward but memo-
rable little dance at the front of the classroom.3 
Almost as soon as my law students absorb the concept of stare decisis, I 
ask them to basically ignore it once the existence of binding or close to binding 
precedent has been ruled out, hopefully through fastidious research, unless it is 
expressly raised in an opinion. Principles of stare decisis rarely decide a com-
mon law legal dispute because similar cases can almost always be distin-
guished one way or another. Unless a statute directly addresses the merits of a 
dispute, “the law” as drafted and enacted by a legislature may have little im-
pact. For judges with integrity, their job is to filter out bias toward any party or 
legal representative and then promulgate fairness and equity. 
III. THE COMMON LAW IS TOO COMPLICATED FOR ROBOTS 
The common law is, as Bernstein describes it, a “living jurisprudential 
system that changes over time.”4 If precedent were really as important and 
binding as formalists like to pretend it is, it might seem feasible to replace hu-
man lawyers and judges with robots. Robots might facially appear to be neutral 
jurists, but the real justice (or lack thereof) they administered would be a func-
tion of algorithmic computer programs written by technologists with little 
comprehension of the common law as Bernstein understands and explains it. 
As a growing body of literature demonstrates, algorithms can be riddled with 
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biases that are difficult to control for and recognize. Artificial intelligence 
(“AI”) programs are usually based on the category of algorithms known as 
deep learning, which find patterns in data.5 Bias can affect the framing of a 
problem, the collection of data, and the preparation of data.6 Even if bias is 
identified, “it’s hard to retroactively identify where that bias came from and 
then figure out how to get rid of it.”7  
For example: “In 2004, when Google had a problem with neo-Nazi sites 
showing up as high-ranked outputs for searches on ‘Jew,’” the company even-
tually learned that this occurred because “[i]n a nutshell, legitimate queries and 
pages tended to say ‘Judaism’ or ‘Jewish;’ bigots used ‘Jew’ more.”8 When 
Amazon.com engineers discovered that an AI internal recruitment tool was 
penalizing female job candidates, they realized it was because their AI had 
been “trained” by past hiring decisions that favored men.9 Essentially, “Ama-
zon’s system taught itself that male candidates were preferable. It penalized 
resumes that included the word ‘women’s,’ as in ‘women’s chess club captain.’ 
And it downgraded graduates of two all-women’s colleges.”10 Even after Ama-
zon engineers reprogrammed the tool to disregard gendered words, “[t]hey 
soon discovered that the revised [AI] was still picking up on implicitly gen-
dered words—verbs that were highly correlated with men over women, such as 
‘executed’ and ‘captured’—and using that to make its decisions.”11 
Testing will not uncover AI bias if the data is split into two parts—data for 
training and data for post training validation—because the data used to test the 
performance of the AI will have the same biases as the data used to train it.12 In 
addition, AI will not be very good at fairness. One commentator observed: 
It’s also not clear what the absence of bias should look like. This 
isn’t true just in computer science—this question has a long history 
of debate in philosophy, social science, and law. What’s different 
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about computer science is that the concept of fairness has to be de-
fined in mathematical terms, like balancing the false positive and 
false negative rates of a prediction system. But as researchers have 
discovered, there are many different mathematical definitions of 
fairness that are also mutually exclusive. Does fairness mean, for 
example, that the same proportion of black and white individuals 
should get high risk assessment scores? Or that the same level of 
risk should result in the same score regardless of race? It’s impossi-
ble to fulfill both definitions at the same time . . . so at some point 
you have to pick one. But whereas in other fields this decision is 
understood to be something that can change over time, the computer 
science field has a notion that it should be fixed.13 
 As these experiences indicate, robots could be programmed to be more 
consistent than humans, if consistency was considered an important founda-
tional goal of the common law. But robots might rule consistently badly. Ra-
ther than removing human biases from important decisions, artificial intelli-
gence would simply automate them. The human instinct for fairness, as 
ephemeral as it might be, animates the common law in ways that machines 
may never be able to replicate. 
IV. UNWANTED PENETRATION 
Bernstein is tough on the common law at times, particularly when it is 
wielded against women by men. Given the dramatic new challenges to repro-
ductive rights, some of what she relates about abortion rights is more anxiety 
producing than reassuring. I found Chapter Four, entitled “Unwanted Penetra-
tion,” to be the most intellectually arresting part of a book. Bernstein asserts 
that the common law unequivocally accords women “sole and despotic domin-
ion” over our own bodies; we can refuse access to our bodies, and especially 
our vaginas, for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all.14 She describes 
rape as unwanted touchings that are “exceptionally unwanted and exceptional-
ly invasive.”15 She says that under the common law “[i[ndividuals are entitled 
to cash damages when they suffer unwanted sexual penetration, and they may 
also kill an invader to fend it off.”16 She walks the reader through various 
analogies of the body to real property, and explains that if the common law 
renders trespass to property an actionable tort, it surely has the capacity to ap-
propriately sanction rape through civil law. She extolls the usefulness of crimi-
nal trespass to the common law response to rape, explaining that “[w]hen rape 
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is understood as trespass, the law protects individuals at risk of rape with civil 
recourse and the possibility of criminal prosecution.”17 Rape is a difficult topic 
to address, but you would not know that from the detailed mapping of the in-
tersections of rape and common law doctrines that Bernstein courageously 
provides. It is here that both Bernstein’s fearlessness, the seemingly bottomless 
depth of her knowledge about the common law, and her capacity for truly orig-
inal thinking are well showcased. It is a great follow up to Chapter Three, 
which is entitled: “Women Too May Say No to What They Don’t Want.” 
CONCLUSION 
I strongly recommend this book. The freshness of her writing voice and 
the intricacy with which Bernstein develops her arguments are wonderful. It is 
not a fast read, because it is filled with complicated observations about very 
intricate, thorny subjects. But anyone interested in a spirited defense of our 
common law system from a women-forward perspective will really appreciate 
the contributions it makes. It would also make a great addition to syllabi for 
courses like Advanced Torts and Feminist Legal Theory. 
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